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Abstract  
The European Parliament (EP) has a long-established reputation as an ‘environmental 
champion’. Yet environmental policy has potentially been profoundly and negatively affected 
by the conglomerate of crises that has beset the European Union since the late 2000s. There 
has been a swing to the right within the Parliament in recent elections, and the entry of a 
range environmentally-sceptic states to the EU, which may have led to weakening policy 
ambition. This article uses a mix of quantitative and qualitative data to analyse whether there 
has been a shift in the EP’s treatment of legislation, such that it has tried to weaken the policy 
ambition of proposals since the late 2000s. The analysis finds limited evidence of a general 
trend to deliberately water down legislation, and overall suggests that despite a less 
favourable policy context the EP still can and does exercise a positive influence over EU 
environmental policy.  
Keywords: Crises; Enlargement; Environmental champion; European Parliament; 
Environmental Policy  
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Introduction  
The European Parliament (EP) emerged as a key environmental actor in the European Union 
(EU), especially in the late 1980s and 1990s as the Commission brought forward an 
ambitious swathe of environmental legislation. Today environmental protection is considered 
to be a mature area of EU policy where the EP has long enjoyed substantial policy influence 
(Zito et al. 2019). The Treaty of Lisbon introduced only limited changes to the EP’s 
environmental policy-making powers, by marginally expanding them in relation to 
international treaties. This article analyses what has happened to this established policy area 
in the Lisbon era, where there have been limited formal treaty changes to the environmental 
acquis, but a range of other significant challenges have emerged, not least the conglomerate 
of crises (Falkner 2016; Burns et al. 2019), that may have shaped the EP’s willingness and 
ability to exercise environmental policy influence.   
To address this question the article critically analyses the EP’s environmental policy 
behaviour between 2004 and 2016. It does so by reviewing the EP’s impact upon all 
environmental policies proposed under the ordinary legislative procedure (OLP) and 
examining three policy case studies in more depth to uncover the explanations for the EP’s 
positions. It  thereby contributes to a wider debate about the conditions shaping the exercise 
of parliamentary influence in this policy field. The analysis suggests that Lisbon’s 
introduction of a wider range of policies and the Juncker Commission’s justice and home 
affairs agenda has led to a waning importance of the environment as a policy area within the 
EU and within the EP. Yet despite this less favourable policy context the EP has mobilised 
effectively to ensure policies it favours have not been withdrawn, and continues to be able to 
exercise policy influence, but as in other policy sectors where the EP’s amendments pose 
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substantial costs either for states or large industrial concerns, its influence is stymied 
(Schoeller and Héritier 2019).  In the following section the literatures on the EP as an 
environmental champion, and the impact of the conglomerate of crises upon EU 
environmental policy-making dynamics, are reviewed in order to identify expectations about 
the EP’s behaviour. Section three outlines the methods used, section four presents the data, 
before conclusions are offered in section five.     
The European Parliament as an environmental champion  
It is well established that the European Parliament has benefited from successive waves of 
Treaty reform seeing its legislative powers increased to the extent that it now has power to 
negotiate with the Council in most policy areas. The EP’s Environment Committee was an 
early beneficiary of these processes of parliamentarisation and was a key actor in pushing for 
and exploiting increases in the Parliament’s power, thereby gaining the EP a reputation as an 
environmental champion (Judge 1992; Burns 2012). The EP’s committees are the repositories 
of policy expertise, with the members of the committees taking responsibility for drafting 
legislative reports (being rapporteurs), leading negotiations with the Council and signalling 
the preferences of the committee to the plenary to secure support for amendments (Burns 
2013). They therefore play a central role in shaping policy outputs and in developing the 
Parliament’s inter-institutional and wider public reputation (ibid). For the Environment 
Committee the adoption of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986 provided a window of 
opportunity for increasing its own and the EP’s wider influence.  
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The SEA ushered in an increase in environmental policies that were advanced both to protect 
the environment but also to ensure a level playing field across the common market, so that 
countries with lower environmental standards did not gain a competitive advantage over 
those with higher standards.  The EP co-operated actively with the Commission to shape 
policy and to increase the power of both institutions in relation to environmental policy 
(Judge 1992). The Environment Committee was a keen advocate of using the own initiative 
process to try to set the Commission’s policy agenda (Judge 1992; Burns 2013). The 
Parliament was also regarded as a key entry point to the legislative process for environmental 
non-governmental organisations (ENGOs) that struggle to influence decision-making in the 
Council and Commission. The EP’s identification as an environmental champion in this 
period was based upon its willingness and ability to strengthen legislation, to increase the 
profile of environmental policy, and to represent the interests of ENGOs. Crucially however, 
actors within the EP used the environment as a vehicle for pursuing wider institutional 
prerogatives, most notably the pursuit of greater legislative power. 
With the advent of the ordinary legislative procedure (OLP) (also known codecision) the 
Environment Committee became one of the largest customers of codecision, consistently 
dealing with the second highest number of codecision reports between 1994 and 2004 
(European Parliament 1999; 2004). However, analysis of the EP’s treatment of environmental 
policy proposals over time revealed that as the EP’s powers increased it appeared to become 
less radical in its demands (Burns and Carter 2010; Burns et al. 2013). Hence there appears to 
have been a trade-off between influence and ambition. As the parliament achieved more 
policy influence it appeared to become less environmentally ambitious. A key reason for this 
shift was the changing dynamic between the EP and Council. The relationship between the 
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two institutions transformed as the OLP extended, as they were obliged to meet on a regular 
basis to negotiate policy, and these negotiations increasingly took place in informal secluded 
meetings (Reh et al. 2013). The behaviour of both institutions changed with the Council 
being prepared to engage more productively with the EP, and the EP tempering its own 
amendments to legislation, knowing that it was likely to see more of them adopted (Burns et 
al. 2013). The growth of informal contacts between the two has increased steadily over the 
years, along with the growing informalisation of decision-making under the OLP (Farrell and 
Héritier 2004; Rasmussen and Reh 2013; Reh et al. 2013). One consequence of this changed 
legislative context is that the EP no longer needs to propose highly ambitious amendments in 
the expectation that they will be rejected or watered down. Indeed, because of the ways in 
which decision-making has evolved, so that MEPs have greater contact with the Council, the 
EP increasingly proposes amendments that it knows will secure the support of the Council.  
Nevertheless, whilst the EP appears to have become less demanding in its amendments 
studies suggest that it still generally sought to advance the environmental interest by 
strengthening legislation proposed by the Commission and taking a more pro-environment 
stance than the Council. For example, a mass study of all EP amendments adopted to 
environmental legislation under the OLP between 1999 and 2009 revealed that the EP rarely 
adopted amendments that weakened legislation and that when it did so it was to offer 
derogations to accession states, or to deal with particular sectors (the military) or 
geographical conditions (Burns et al. 2013). However, this study focussed upon the period 
immediately preceding and following the enlargement of the EU in 2004, which brought in 
another eight states, with three further states joining the EU in 2007 and 2013. Burns et al. 
(2012) suggest that in the immediate period following enlargement the newer Member States 
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spent time acclimatising themselves with the operations of the Council and were not 
particularly active in the environmental policy field. Similarly studies of EP voting behaviour 
suggest that the new MEPs rapidly acclimatised themselves to voting with the larger political 
groups rather than forming national or regional voting blocs (Scully et al. 2012).  
Since that initial period however, further studies indicate that newer Member states 
particularly from Central and Eastern Europe, notably Poland (Jankowska 2017; Skjaerseth 
2018) and the Czech Republic (Braun 2014) have started to cooperate with one another to 
weaken or temper the ambition of environmental (especially climate) policies. The so-called 
Visegrad states of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia have held regular 
meetings to coordinate their positions in order to defend their interests in Council meetings 
(Wurzel et al. 2019). This new dynamic has two possible implications for environmental 
policy and the exercise of EP influence. First, the  EP maybe more likely to find itself in the 
position of defending the environment and seeking to exercise  influence if policy proposals 
are weaker in the first place because the Commission anticipates policies being weakened by 
the Council, or because the Council suggests changes that water down environmental 
ambition. Second,  given that MEPs from Central and East European states make up just 
under a quarter of all MEPs it may be that a similar ‘Visegrad’ effect is at work within the 
Parliament with MEPs from the newer states seeking to protect national interests by 
weakening key environmental policies. Here the EP may simply align its preferences with 
those of the Council and demonstrate limited ambition but apparent influence as it 
successfully secures its stated preferences in the face of limited opposition.     
In addition to this enlargement dynamic the EU has been beset by a ‘conglomerate of crises’ 
since 2007-8 (Falkner 2016), which is likely to have an effect upon environmental ambition 
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and policy-making dynamics. The global economic crisis led to the Eurozone crisis, bringing 
with it concerns that Greece would crash out of the Eurozone, a series of financial bailouts to 
debt ridden states, including Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain, with accompanying 
conditions that utilities be privatised and austerity pursued in those states. There has been an 
on-going migration crisis, a wave of populist protest and the emergence of new parties such 
as Podemos and Cuidanos in Spain and Syriza in Greece. There has also been an increase in 
the success of long-standing populist parties such as the Front National, which was able to 
bring together a far-right grouping in the European Parliament in 2015. The most recent 
Italian election saw the election of euro-sceptic parties (Barnes 2018) and in 2016 the UK 
voted in a referendum to leave the EU.    
Unsurprisingly given this tumultuous period, a growing body of work is emerging analysing 
the policy impacts of these crises (See Falkner 2016; Burns et al. 2019). Yet, there have been 
relatively few studies of the impact of the crisis upon the Parliament, with those that have 
emerged generally focussing upon economic governance and legislation (e.g. see Schoeller 
and Héritier 2019; Bressanelli and Chelotti 2018; Roger et al. 2017; O’Keefe et al. 2016) 
with few focussing on the EP’s environmental behaviour (Burns and Carter 2012 is an 
exception). Given that the crises broke as new and more environmentally-sceptic states joined 
the EU; as a wave of populism saw the success of typically more environmentally-sceptic 
parties from the right in the 2009 and 2014 European elections; and as the Lisbon Treaty 
entered into force in 2009, extending the OLP to over 85 policy areas, thereby considerably 
extending the EP’s workload; it seems reasonable to expect disruption in environmental 
policy-making. Given the shift in the composition of the EP geographically to the East and 
ideologically to the climate-sceptic right, it seems credible that the Parliament will have 
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become less environmentally ambitious post-2009. But it also seems likely that the EP’s 
success in achieving its stated preferences (i.e. its influence) has remained stable as it is likely 
that the EP continues to prefer to be successful in securing its amendments and therefore to 
align its preferences with those of the Commission and Council. In the following section the 
mixed methods approach used to identify the patterns of environmental policy-making from 
2004 onwards is explained along with the way in which the EP’s environmental behaviour is 
evaluated, and explanations for the pattern of policy-making are developed. The data are then 
presented in section four before some conclusions are offered in section five on whether the 
EP continues to influence policy in an environmentally ambitious direction in the post-Lisbon 
era.       
Methods  
In order to determine the EP’s policy ambition and success in the period since Lisbon 
environmental policy activity over a twelve-year period is reviewed, covering the two 
Barroso Commissions from September 2004 to July 2014, and the first two and a half years 
of the Juncker Commission up to the end of 2016, which straddle the introduction of Lisbon, 
and the era of crisis. The purpose of this large n analysis is to determine the overall direction 
of EU environmental policy in this period (more or less ambitious); the EP’s ability to shape 
individual policy proposals; and the direction in which it has done so (more or less 
ambitious).  Environmental policy adopted under the ordinary legislative procedure is 
analysed and relevant pieces of legislation were identified using Eur-Lex, and the European 
Parliament’s Legislative Observatory. 75 environmental policy proposals were identified  that 
were proposed and adopted between September 2004 and December 2016.  
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A five-point scale for categorising environmental policy ambition was used, building upon 
the work of Burns and Carter (2010), who devised a scale for calculating the environmental 
ambition of European Parliament amendments (See Table 1).  In a departure from Burns and 
Carter (2010) this analysis focuses upon pieces of legislation rather than individual 
amendments. One reason for this innovation is the changing behaviour of the EP. Until the 
early 2000s the EP plenary records showed each amendment separately with a number and 
clear indication of its placement in legislation and an indication through voting records of 
preferences from the parties on amendments. However, increasingly the EP simply votes on 
the whole text as amended. The individual amendments are negotiated and discussed within 
the Parliament’s Committees and within informal meetings with the Council. The legislative 
trail for amendments is therefore now much harder to trace. Hence here the analysis  focuses 
upon determining the difference for policy proposals and final outputs.  
Each piece of legislation was coded according to its level of ambition when first proposed by 
the Commission (the ‘proposal score’) and again based on the final text (in other words, after 
any amendments by the Council or EP had been adopted, the ‘final score’). In determining 
the score the proposal was evaluated according to whether it advanced the status quo. All the 
legislative documents associated with each proposal as it made its way through the legislative 
process, were examined along with associated media reports and grey literature. As the 
difference between the proposal and the final outcome is a product of negotiation between the 
EP and Council for each piece of legislation significant amendments proposed by the 
Parliament Committee prior to negotiations under the OLP were noted, as well as those 
proposed to the plenary following negotiations, (using a combination of committee and 
plenary records) and whether they had been adopted and were deemed to have made a 
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difference to the overall score. This initial phase of analysis simply gives a rough idea of 
whether the EP’s involvement in decision-making has an impact upon the ambition of each 
piece of legislation. Analysing patterns from 2004 to 2016 allowed a determination of 
whether the involvement of the EP has significantly changed policy outcomes over time, the 
assumption being that if the EP has changed those outcomes it has been able to exercise 
influence. 
The literature suggests a number of dynamics maybe shaping environmental policy 
behaviour: the crisis dampening overall environmental ambition; the accession of more 
environmentally sceptic states to the EU; and the emergence of far-right climate sceptic 
parties in the EP. To delve beneath the headline indicators of the large n analysis to determine 
if and how these factors are shaping EP behaviour and success three cases are examined in 
greater depth: one where the policy was weakened at least in part by the EP; one where 
policy was weakened despite the attempts of the EP to strengthen it; and one where policy 
was strengthened. These cases can only provide snapshots of behaviour but through a more 
in-depth analysis it is possible to uncover explanations for the patterns of behaviour revealed 
by the larger n analysis, and in so doing to suggest some plausible conditions that may 
determine the EP’s positions. A range of primary and secondary data sources were used 
including the formal record of the plenary and contemporaneous media reports and 
interviews with key personnel from the Commission, Council, EP and ENGOs.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Environmental policy-making and the EP 2004-2016. 
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The first thing to note is that none of the Commission’s proposed legislation received a score 
of five the highest in the Environmental Ambition Typology and nor were any of the 
proposals ranked four strengthened to five (see Table 2). The proposal to update National 
Emissions Ceilings for certain atmospheric pollutants (European Commission 2013a) could 
have been a five, however, because the proposal included a range of derogations and 
flexibilities it was ranked four.  There were only two policies graded as a one under the EA 
typology (i.e. they weakened the status quo) between 2004 and 2009 and the policy output 
remained the same as the proposal in terms of score; there were five neutral policies, one of 
which was strengthened to a four by the EP and one to a three; three of the fourteen proposals 
graded three were strengthened to fours and none were weakened. The fours kept the same 
ranking.  
By contrast there were six proposals deemed to weaken the status quo between 2009 and 
2014, which means that 19% of the policy proposals brought forward between 2009 and 2014 
weakened existing policy compared to only 6.5% of those brought forward between 2004 and 
2009. Similarly, proportionally more neutral policies were brought forward between 2009 and 
2014 (41% of the total for the period compared to 16% for EP6). Of these neutral policies 
four were strengthened. There were proportionally fewer threes and fours. 32% of the 
proposals between 2004 and 2009 were ranked four compared to just 12% of those proposed 
between 2009 and 2014. Two of those proposed in EP7 were weakened. Turning to the first 
two and a half years of EP8, none of the policies proposed are deemed to have weakened the 
status quo although it is worth noting that the circular economy package brought forward in 
2015 was weaker than the original proposal in 2014 (Crisp 2015a). There was one neutral 
policy brought forward, which was strengthened via the legislative process, three proposals 
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ranked three that stayed the same and three proposals ranked four, of which two were 
weakened via the legislative process. Analysing the direction of change between the proposal 
and adoption one more policy was strengthened in EP7, but a greater number of the policy 
proposals were weaker in the first place. In EP8 there was both a higher proportion of fours 
proposed and a higher proportion of policies weakened. In this case however, the number of 
cases is much smaller.  
It is also worth noting that some policies attracted amendments that simultaneously weakened 
and strengthened the policy which means the proposal and final score stayed the same, 
despite the legislative content of the proposal being amended. For example, on a proposal on 
batteries the EP extended the deadline for cadmium batteries staying on the market by one 
year, thereby weakening the status quo, but included in the proposal a new category of 
batteries (mercury batteries) (European Parliament 2013a), thereby strengthening the 
proposal. In this case the amendments were judged to cancel each other out.  
[Insert Tables 2&3 about here] 
In addition to analysing legislation a series of forty-nine interviews were carried out in 2013 
and 2015 with actors from all three major institutions (EP, Council and Commission) and 
ENGOs to ask their views of trajectory of EU environmental policy. An interesting response 
in 2013 concerned the volume of work. For example, an MEP from the Environment 
Committee expressed the view that there was less work for the Committee to do as too few 
proposals were being brought forward by the Commission (Interview 1). This suggestion 
chimed with the views of interviewees from the Commission and ENGOs who suggested that 
in the immediate aftermath of the economic crisis there was little appetite for environmental 
legislation, and therefore correspondingly fewer policies were proposed (Interview 2 & 3). 
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However, Figure 1 shows that whilst it was the case that there were comparatively fewer 
environmental policy proposals in the first half of the 2009-2014 parliamentary session, the 
difference is not that great compared to the previous session. In the first two and a half years 
of EP6 (2004 to 2006) fifteen proposals were made, by contrast in EP7 twelve proposals were 
made and in the first two years of EP8 ten were made. In both EP6 and EP7 sessions more 
proposals were made in the second half, which is consistent with normal patterns of 
legislative activity (see Burns et al. 2013).  
However, analysis of the relative standing of the environment compared to other policy 
sectors reveals that over time the Environment Committee has gone from being responsible 
for roughly half of all the co-decision files that passed through the Parliament to dealing with 
14% in the 2009-2014 Parliament (although the Environment Committee still had the largest 
share of reports) (European Parliament 2014a) and only 10% in the first half of 2014-2019 
session (European Parliament 2016). Since 2014 Jean-Claude Juncker’s Commission has 
made Justice and Home Affairs a key priority area leading to more legislation in this field 
(European Parliament 2016). Hence the introduction of new policy sectors post-Lisbon and a 
different Commission agenda has seen the relative importance of the environment decline. 
Moreover, when the Juncker Commission first took office it identified a number of 
environmental policy proposals that it might withdraw as part of its better regulation agenda, 
including notably, the circular economy package. Following extensive lobbying the circular 
economy package was re-proposed albeit with less ambitious targets (Crisp 2015a). Therefore 
the EP Environment Committee has arguably been operating in a more hostile policy 
environment since 2014: the combination of enlargement, and the fact that a substantial body 
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of environmental legislation had already been adopted, has reduced the appetite for new 
environmental policy proposals (Burns et al. 2019). In the following attention section we 
engage in more detailed case studies in order to uncover and analyse some of the drivers of 
these patterns of legislative behaviour. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Case studies 
Only five policies were weakened via OLP in the period under study (see Table 4). Analysing 
the passage of the legislation reveals that in only one of these cases was there clear evidence 
of the EP calling for a weakening of policy. It is challenging to disentangle whether the EP 
did so following lobbying and contacts with the Council, but typically and certainly since the 
adoption of clearer rules on when and how the EP can engage with the Council when 
agreeing at first-reading, EP Committee amendments can be used as a proxy for the EP’s 
views prior to contacts with the Council. The plenary amendments typically represent the 
outcome of negotiations with the Council (especially for policies agreed at first reading).  To 
better understand the policy dynamics at play it is worth expanding the brief commentary 
provided in Table 4 to analyse why the EP chose to weaken legislation and how and why its 
efforts to strengthen legislation (in the case of air quality) were unsuccessful and the final 
legislation was weaker compared to the Commission proposal. 
The case where the evidence suggests that the EP was involved in weakening legislation 
concerned the regulation of priority substances in water. In this case the Commission brought 
forward a proposal that reviewed the list of the chemicals identified as presenting a 
significant risk to or via the aquatic environment (priority substances) under the Water 
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Framework Directive (WFD) (European Commission 2011). Controversy emerged over the 
Commission’s inclusion of three new pharmaceuticals to be counted as priority substances, 
with associated environmental quality standards that had to be met under the terms of the 
WFD. Those substances were two widely available contraceptives (17 alpha-ethinylestradiol 
(EE2), 17 beta-estradiol (E2)) and an anti-inflammatory pain-killer, (Diclofenac i.e. 
ibuprofen). The Parliament amended the legislation to remove these three substances from 
the list that had environmental quality standards – placing them instead on a watch list for the 
Commission to keep under review (European Parliament 2012). The implication of this 
change was the Commission would keep monitoring the presence and potential effects of the 
substances without Member States being required to change domestic practices to reduce the 
presence of these substances in the environment. The reason given for doing so in the 
Committee report was 
‘Setting EQS for these substances at the present state of knowledge of their 
occurrence and effects to the aquatic environment may pose problems because of 
the preponderant importance of human health considerations: water policy should 
not determine directly the health policy of Member States (European Parliament 
2012, 26).’ 
This quote implies that the setting of EQS for the three substances was premature and that 
there wasn’t sufficient scientific evidence of harm to justify setting an EQS, particularly 
given the potential consequences for the use of pharmaceuticals that are regularly prescribed. 
By suggesting that these substances required regulating, the Commission proposal raised the 
prospect of significant costs being imposed either on water companies, pharmaceutical 
companies or the wider public (and animals, which can benefit from the veterinary use of 
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diclofenac) who faced the prospect of no longer being able to access these drugs.  The 
Standing Committee on Health and Environmental Risks (SCHER) indicated that there was a 
case for an EQS for the contraceptives and supported the proposed level (SCHER 2011a; 
2011b). On diclofenac SCHER acknowledged that the evidence was less straightforward as 
whilst there is clear evidence of the toxic impacts of the substance upon fish, there is less 
evidence of its impacts upon other populations (SCHER 2011c). Hence, whilst the rapporteur 
raised questions about the validity of the scientific evidence, it is clear that for two of the 
substances (EE2 and E2) SCHER agreed with the Commission’s EQS and in the other case 
there was scope to include diclofenac as a substance requiring an EQS but the lack of data on 
other species raised doubts.  
However, another reason was mobilised by states and the European Parliament to justify the 
removal of the substances from the EQS list to a watch list: cost. Commissioner Potocnik 
made clear that the economic crisis was used to justify the exclusion of substances from the 
list of EQS, stating:  
‘The scientific evidence on the risks from these substances would justify a shorter 
timetable for complying with the objectives set out in the proposal. The current 
economic pressures across the Union are not an adequate excuse for failing to 
deal properly with such risks. But in the interests of avoiding further delays, we 
accept the compromise agreement in order to ensure a first reading deal 
(Potocnik, European Parliament 2013b)’. 
MEP Julie Girling from the European Conservative Reform Group (ECR) raised economic 
costs and the crisis during her contribution to the debate:  
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‘I have always been against the Commission’s inclusion of the three 
pharmaceuticals in the list of priority substances, due to what I believe to be the 
unjustifiably large costs of treating wastewater to remove them. In the UK alone, 
the cost was estimated at EUR 35 billion over 20 years. Inflicting such costs on 
households, through high water bills, at a time of economic difficulty is 
unacceptable.  (Girling, European Parliament 2013b).’ 
The crisis was also raised by João Ferreir from the European United Left and Nordic Green 
Left (GUE/NGL) but in the context of privatization of water in Portugal as a condition of 
bailout funding. Mr Ferreir suggested that this move would make monitoring water quality 
harder over the long term (Ferreir, European Parliament 2013b). In this case then we have a 
clear example of the EP weakening the legislation against the wishes of the Commission, but 
with the support of some states in Council. Some actors discursively mobilised the crisis as 
part of the justification for the EP’s amendments. Interestingly when it came to vote the 
GUE/NGL voted against the proposal and there were a handful of defections from the other 
groups, but nothing to suggest a Visegrad effect or a right-wing enviro-sceptic vote.  A 
handful of MEPs from the right wing Europe for Freedom and Democracy (EFD) group and 
an ECR member voted against the resolution but the others from both groups voted in favour 
(European Parliament 2013c).  
The second case, where the EP battled to ensure legislation was brought forward and then to 
strengthen it (albeit unsuccessfully) concerns the adoption of national emission ceilings for 
atmospheric pollutants. In this case the Commission’s proposal repealed and replaced 
existing legislation on national emissions ceilings for atmospheric pollutants for 2020 and 
2030 and also proposed extending the scope of the directive to include particulate matter 
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from 2020 and methane from 2030 (European Commission 2013a). The proposal included 
differentiated targets for each Member State and each pollutant and required Member States 
to adopt national air pollution control programmes, which would be updated every two years 
(ibid.).  
The proposal was initially brought forward by the Barroso Commission, but following the 
appointment of a new Commission in 2014, there was a suggestion that it would be 
withdrawn under the Better Regulation agenda, which was introduced to streamline EU 
policies. Member State concerns over costs were the principal reason for the mooted 
withdrawal (European Parliament 2015a). Following robust representation by the EP and 
ENGOs the proposal was brought forward, suggesting that the EP can still exercise influence. 
The Parliament sought to introduce mandatory limits for 2025 (except for ammonia), thereby 
tightening the proposed legislation, to reduce the various flexibilities (such as offsetting 
maritime emissions), and to maintain the overall ambition of original proposal to reduce 
health impacts from air pollution. However, the inclusion of methane in the proposals, and 
the targets for ammonia, were controversial within the Parliament, with the agriculture 
committee and members of the rapporteur’s own political group speaking against the 
Environment Committee report (European Parliament 2015b; Crisp 2015b).  
A key concern on methane and ammonia was that the regulation of these substances would 
have implications for those countries with a large agriculture sector and higher emissions. 
Unsurprisingly given the divisions already apparent within the EP and the fact that the 
Commission had considered withdrawing the proposal over costs, the final agreement was 
weaker than both the Commission’s original proposal and the EP’s amended first reading. 
Methane emissions were excluded from the directive and a variety of derogations and 
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loopholes were included such as Member States being freed from compliance following 
exceptionally hot or cold years (European Parliament and Council 2016a, Article 5). 
The agricultural lobby and some states, especially the UK and Poland, lobbied hard to keep 
methane out of the directive and to weaken overall ambition. Notably, the GUE and the 
Greens defected en masse, as did Polish members of the ECR group reflecting the fact that 
this policy was deemed too weak for the greens, and despite the many derogations, still too 
strong for the Polish contingent of the ECR (European Parliament 2015c). There is some 
limited evidence of an Eastern dimension but the power of the agricultural lobby and the high 
costs associated with meeting air quality laws for a number of states led to a weaker outcome 
than the EP wanted.  
Our final case is an example of the EP successfully strengthening legislation: the proposal to 
amend the packaging and packaging waste directive to reduce the consumption of lightweight 
plastic carrier bags. In this case the Commission proposal had the aim of reducing plastic bag 
consumption within two years of the entry into force of the directive but did not specify 
targets (European Commission 2013b). Commissioner Potocnik claimed that the reason for 
the failure to include specific targets stemmed from the different consumption within states, 
with Denmark having an average of four bags per consumer per year, whereas in Poland, 
Portugal and Slovakia, the average use was 466 bags per person (European Parliament 
2014b). Unsurprisingly, given the lack of specific targets in the Commission proposal, the 
Parliament introduced them and also added measures relating to biodegradable plastics. The 
proposal was then delayed by the election and the appointment of a new Commission and, as 
with other proposals, it got caught up in the Commission’s better regulation agenda (Jacobsen 
2015). Here, despite the fact that the EP and the Council were prepared to adopt a directive 
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the Commission proposed withdrawing it, leading the rapporteur to state that the Commission 
had been a ‘nuisance’ during the passage of the proposal by failing to support the co-
legislators (European Parliament 2015d). Despite the Commission’s reservations the 
amended directive was adopted. In this case we see a relatively weak proposal strengthened, 
and a united Council working with the Parliament in the face of a reluctant Commission. The 
final piece of legislation, whilst stronger than the Commission proposal, is still relatively 
flexible in offering states different routes for reducing their plastic bag consumption 
(European Parliament and Council 2016b). Moreover, as noted by Commissioner Potocnik in 
the first-reading debates, plastic bags are not generally produced in the EU so there was no 
concerted lobbying effort or industrial mobilisation when the Commission was preparing the 
legislation (European Parliament 2014b). In this respect the case stands in sharp contrast to 
the air quality and priority substance directives.         
Analysis 
All environmental policy proposed under OLP between 2004 and 2016 were reviewed in 
order to determine patterns of behaviour and to identify cases that merited more detailed 
analysis. The literature suggests that a number of dynamics may shape the EP’s ambition and 
influence i) a crisis effect that has dampened policy ambition and reduced the EP’s 
willingness to propose amendments strengthening policy, especially where such amendments 
entail costs; ii) a ‘Visegrad effect’ whereby CEEC states seek to water down legislation and 
iii) a compositional effect whereby the entry of climate-sceptic and CEEC MEPs results in 
weaker positions from by the EP. The potential interaction of these dynamics led to the 
expectation that the Parliament became less environmentally ambitious post-2009, but that its 
success in achieving its stated preferences (i.e. its influence) remained stable. Here it was 
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assumed that the EP continues to prefer to be successful in securing its amendments and 
therefore aligns its preferences with those of the Commission and Council. 
The data and cases suggest that in line with the established literature there is little evidence of 
the EP actively weakening legislation, which stayed roughly the same in terms of its 
environmental ambition between proposal and adoption. There were few examples of overall 
strengthening or weakening, which fits with our broad expectation of policy stability. There 
were only five instances of Commission proposals being weakened and in only one of those 
cases was the EP the key agent of change: on priority substances and here the EP clearly had 
the support of states in Council that wished to avoid additional water treatment costs, or 
further regulation of prescription of popular contraceptive and painkilling pharmaceuticals. 
This policy had the potential to spill over to affect an area of policy reserved to states 
(health), and to impact an industry (the water sector) with the risk of potentially high social 
and industrial costs. The removal of the three priority substances to a watch list is not 
consistent with the behaviour reported in earlier studies of the Parliament, where its negative 
amendments tended to provide derogations for particular countries or to allow weaker 
standards for particular regions or types of vehicles (See Burns et al. 2012; 2013).  In this 
case key actors mobilised arguments about the crisis to justify the EP’s position – but it is 
difficult to disentangle this discursive mobilisation from pre-existing ideological and policy 
preferences.  
  
The priority substances and atmospheric pollutant cases both saw the mobilisation of affected 
industries to weaken the original proposal and the EP’s amendments. In the case of 
atmospheric substances Poland and the UK played key roles within Council on weakening 
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the proposal and there was a defection of all Polish ECR MEPs on the final vote. However, 
here the cost of the directive and the imposition of those costs across a range of states were 
again crucial. By contrast the packaging waste directive on plastic bags had the broad support 
of the Council, and the EP was also united on the issue. In this case it was the Commission 
that was reluctant to adopt specific targets that it felt would be difficult to police given the 
varied consumption of bags across the EU. Here the relative weakness of the original 
proposal, the lack of significant industrial mobilisation, and wider popularity of the 
regulation of plastic bags explain the EP’s success. The case studies reveal limited evidence 
of Visegrad or far right MEPs making a difference within the EP, here the on-going challenge 
of securing agreement amongst the various right-wing groups may have played a role in 
limiting their effectiveness. There is likewise only some limited evidence of the crisis shaping 
the EP’s environmental position. The air quality case suggests a nuanced picture of the EP’s 
influence: by combining with NGOs the EP was able to force the Commission to bring the 
proposal forward but the policy was then significantly weakened as it made its way through 
the legislative process. Overall the main conditions that seem to shape the EP’s influence 
across all cases were the distribution of costs, the mobilisation of powerful industrial sectors 
and the position of the Council.  
Conclusion 
This analysis suggests that there are few attempts of explicit environmental weakening 
emanating from the EP, despite the rise of the right and the presence of MEPs from more 
environmentally sceptic states. Equally there is limited evidence of successful strengthening. 
Here an important caveat is pieces of legislation have been analysed, which means that the 
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shift between proposals and outcome is reviews, which may mask the adoption of ambitious 
or weaker amendments when they cancel each other out. This weakness has been offset by 
analysis of three cases in more depth to uncover policy-making dynamics. Interestingly in the 
case where the EP did strengthen legislation, the original proposal was very weak, and the 
Council and EP were both united in favour of strengthening it.  
The dataset indicates that more weak proposals were brought forward in the 2009-2014 
session that the 2004-2009 session and the start of the Juncker Commission also saw the 
mobilisation of the EP and ENGOs to prevent the withdrawal of proposals. The case studies 
indicate that some states sought to weaken legislation, but not exclusively those from Central 
and Eastern Europe, so there is no strong support that either a Visegrad or right-wing effect 
shaped policy outcomes in a significant way. The number of environmental policy proposals 
brought forward has slowly declined and the relative importance of the environment on the 
policy agenda has waned.  
These findings raise some interesting questions about the characterisation of the EP as an 
environmental champion. The Parliament gained this reputation in an era when its own 
powers were limited, but when the environmental acquis was emerging as a key component 
of the single market programme, with a huge growth in legislative proposals from the later 
1980s until the early 2000s when environmental policy development started to plateau. 
Actors within the Parliament proved adept at using this policy activity to widen the EP’s 
legislative influence. The EP also sought to shape legislation through adopting amendments 
that often had little chance of success, but were symbolically important and could set the 
policy agenda. As the EP became more powerful it seemed to temper its ambition but became 
more successful in securing its policy preferences. Crucially, thanks to the development of 
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the codecision procedure all three institutions are better informed about each other’s 
preferences. In recent times the EP’s environmental activities have generally been less high 
profile and it has normally collaborated with the Commission and Council rather than 
confronting them. Environmental policy is no longer a vehicle for the wider empowerment of 
the Parliament and within the Parliament the environment is waning in importance. By and 
large, despite these challenges the EP has continued to try to strengthen some environmental 
legislation and to push the Commission to bring forward proposals. Hence whilst the era in 
which the EP gained its reputation as an environmental champion has passed, it still behaves 
as a strategic environmental advocate that can, under the right conditions, continue to 
exercise policy influence. References 
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 The proposals listed included 4 proposed in 2015 that were not competed until 2018 – these proposals are not 1
therefore included in the wider data analysis as they were completed after the first half of EP8. 
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Table 1: Environmental Ambition Typology 
5
High ambition: includes ambitious and binding targets/limits/standards 
with clear and specific deadlines. Involves credible monitoring, with 
provisions for resources and training if necessary.
4
Moderate ambition: targets are an advance upon the status quo but are less 
ambitious than strong high ambition. Deadlines included but with long 
timeframes or derogations. Limited monitoring and resources.
3
Limited ambition: rhetorical commitment to advancing status quo but 
limited evidence of resourcing implementation of policy goals or deadlines.
2
Neutral: no discernible environmental impact (maintains status quo). 
Typically editorial and neutral amendments.
1
Negative ambition: weakens status quo by, for example, reducing/
weakening targets, extending deadlines.
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Table 2: Environmental Ambition of Proposals and Final Policies 


















F i n a l 
Scores
1 2 2 6 6 0 0
2 5 4 12 10 1 0
3 14 12 10 12 3 5
4 10 13 4 5 3 2
5 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 31 31 32 32 7 7
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Table 3: Direction of Change in Environmental Ambition by Parliamentary Session  
Direction  
of Change 
EP 6 EP 7 EP8
= 26 (84%) 25 (78% ) 3 (42%)
> 4 (13%) 5 (16%) 2 (29%) 
< 1 (3%) 2 (6%) 2 (29%)
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Table 4: Proposals Weakened During Legislative Process 
Title Proposal 
Score







4 3 European Council led on Council position reducing 
EP scope to engage in negotiation. EP amendments to 
strengthen proposal not adopted. Crisis mobilised to 







4 3 Removal of maritime emissions but Commission 
brought forward later proposal. Linked to wider 
debates over extending ETS to maritime sector.  
Water policy: priority 
substances 
(COD: 2011/0429)
3 2 EP adopted amendments to weaken proposal. Crisis 
mobilised as reason but substantial potential social 
and industrial costs.
On the reduction of 




4 3 EP lobbied to ensure legislation was brought forward 
and sought to tighten with limits for 2025 and 
reduction of flexibilities and to maintain overall 
ambition of original proposal. Council, especially 
Polish Government lobbied for derogations and 
flexibilities. Polish MEPs from the right of centre 
Conservative Reform Group all voted against final 
resolution.
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